

challenge of totalitarianism. Nothing like that will likely ever happen quite like that again. But Smith closes with the caution that danger never disappears; it merely presents itself in unfamiliar forms. A tentative guess is that while caught up in the Cold War abroad we quite missed that fact that at home, and in the North Atlantic as you could say, the acute disorders of industrialism which had been thought unsolvable were largely resolved. Or, if you like, moderated to the point of acceptability. This came about through intellectual disciplines, far more than through politics. (Which is only symmetrical; Marxism was an intellectual discipline.) In the first issue of *The Public Interest*, in an article "The Professionalization of Reform," I more or less bet that this was going to happen. Thirty years later I returned to this theme unapologetic but, well, thirty years older.



#### *The Professionalization of Reform (1965)*

Our best hope for the future lies in the extension to social organization of the methods that we already employ in our most progressive fields of effort. In science and in industry we do not wait for catastrophe to force new ways upon us . . . We rely, and with access, upon quantitative analysis to point the way; and we advance because we are constantly improving and applying such analysis.

The passage above, as succinct a case for social planning as could be made, is not a product of either the thought or the institutions of the liberal left. It is, rather, a statement by the late mathematical economist Wesley C. Mitchell. And it has recently been approvingly reprinted at the beginning of a report on "The Concept of Poverty" published by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

The report itself, the work of businessmen and scholars, is perhaps the most competent commentary on the government's anti-poverty program yet to appear. It is replete with citations of articles in *Social Research* and *Land Economics*, and of data from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*; the perspective ranges from friendly references to the works of Friedrich Engels, to more detached assessments of contemporary tracts. ("Michael Harrington,

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author of a widely read book on poverty, *The Other America*, has written, 'Any gain for America's minorities will immediately be translated into an advance for all the unskilled workers. One cannot raise the bottom of society without benefiting everyone above.' This is almost precisely wrong.") But the report is less significant for what it says than for what it is: an example of the evolving technique and style of reform in the profoundly new society developing in the United States. Lacking a better term, it might be described as the professionalization of reform.

Writing for the British journal the *New Society* just prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, Nathan Glazer described the process: "Without benefit of anything like the Beveridge report to spark and focus public discussion and concern, the United States is passing through a stage of enormous expansion in the size and scope of what we may loosely call the social services—the public programs designed to help people adapt to an increasingly complex and unmanageable society. While Congress has been painfully and hesitantly trying to deal with two great measures—tax reform and a civil rights bill—and its deliberations on both have been closely covered by the mass media, it has also been working with much less publicity on a number of bills which will contribute at least as much to changing the shape of American society."

The vast Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act had just become law. The no less enormous vocational education bill was moving steadily through Congress. The Kennedy administration had earlier obtained such measures as the Area Redevelopment Act, the Manpower Development and Training Act, and the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962. "Waiting in the wings" were a domestic peace corps and an ambitious youth conservation corps, while the community action programs developed by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, established in 1961, were scheduled for new and expanded funding.

It is a special mind that can as much as keep the titles of those programs straight. But the most interesting thing about all this sudden expansion of social services was that it had behind it, as

Glazer noted, "nothing like the powerful political pressure and long-sustained intellectual support that produced the great welfare measures of the New Deal—Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Public Welfare, Public Housing." The "massive political support and intellectual leadership that produced the reforms of the thirties" simply did not exist; yet the reforms were moving forward.

Glazer accounted for this in terms of the emergence of a large body of professional persons and professional organizations that had taken on themselves the concern for the 20 to 30 percent of the population that was outside the mainstream of American prosperity. Intellectuals knew little about the subject, and were not much interested. Organized labor, while both concerned and knowledgeable, had had but limited success in involving its membership in such efforts. As a result, "The fate of the poor is in the hands of the administrators and the professional organizations of doctors, teachers, social workers, therapists, counselors and so forth. It is these who, in a situation where the legislation and programs become ever more complex, spend the time to find out—or rather have brought home to them—through their work the effects of certain kinds of measures and programs, and who propose ever more complex programs which Congress deliberates upon in the absence of any major public interest. When Congress argues these programs, the chief pressures upon it are not the people, but the organized professional interests that work with that segment of the problem, and those who will benefit from or be hurt by the legislation."

The antipoverity program that was being developed even as Glazer wrote is far the best instance of the professionalization of reform yet to appear. In its genesis, its development, and now in its operation, it is a prototype of the social technique of action that will almost certainly become more common in the future. It is a technique that will not appeal to everyone, and in which many will perceive the not altogether imaginary danger of a too-powerful government. But it is also a technique that offers a profound promise of social sanity and stability in time to come.

There are two aspects of the poverty program which distinguish

it from earlier movements of its kind: The initiative came largely from within. And the case for action was based on essentially esoteric information about the past and probable future course of events.

The most distinctive break with the past is with regard to initiative. War on poverty was not declared at the behest of the poor. Just the opposite. The poor were not only invisible, as Michael Harrington described them, they were also for the most part silent. John F. Kennedy ventured into Appalachia searching for Protestant votes, not for poverty. There he encountered the incredible pauperization of the mountain people, most particularly the soft coal miners, an industrial work force whose numbers had been reduced by nearly two-thirds in the course of a decade—but with hardly a sound of protest. The miners were desperately poor, shockingly unemployed, but neither radical nor in any significant way restive. In 1964, in the face of the historic Democratic sweep, Harlan County, Kentucky, returned a freshman Republican Congressman. True, the civil rights movement was well established and highly effective during this period, but it was primarily concerned with just that: the demand for the recognition of the civil rights of the Negro American. While the movement would clearly in time turn to the problem of poverty and of the economic position of the Negro, it had only begun to do so, as in the March on Washington in August 1963, and its economic demands were still general and essentially traditional, as for example an increased minimum wage.

Apart from the always faithful labor movement, the only major lobbies working for any of the programs that came together to form the war on poverty were the conservationists supporting the youth conservation camps, and the National Committee on the Employment of Youth, an organization representing a variety of groups in the social welfare field. The essential fact is that the main pressure for a massive government assault on poverty developed within the Kennedy-Johnson administration, among officials whose responsibilities were to think about just such matters. These men now exist, they are well paid, have competent staffs, and have access to the

President. (Many of these officials, of course, were originally brought to Washington by the New Deal: they are by no means all *nuovi buomini*.) Most importantly, they have at their command an increasing fund of information about social conditions in the United States.

Almost all this information is public, but the art of interpreting it is, in a sense, private. Anyone is free to analyze income statistics, or employment data, or demographic trends to his heart's content. But very few persons in the beginning years of the present decade were able to perceive in those statistics the gradual settling of a poverty class in America. A number of officials in the federal government (mostly academicians on leave) were. Leaving aside the question of whether or not they were right—a question which must always be open—it is clear that the judgment they reached was quite at variance, almost poles apart, from the general public understanding of the time.

Whereas the public, both high and low in the intellectual hierarchy, saw income distribution steadily compressing, saw the Negro American more and more winning his rightful place in society, saw prosperity spreading through the land, the men in the government saw something quite different: an income distribution gap that had not budged since the end of the war, and had in fact worsened sharply for Negroes, a rising measure of social disorganization among poor families and poor communities, a widening gap between the prospects of the poor and those of the middle class.

In President Johnson these officials found a chief executive who knew a good deal about poverty, and seemingly everything about politics. In a matter of weeks from the time he assumed office, the array of programs and bills Glazer had described as "waiting in the wings" were mustered into a coherent legislative program, reinforced by some entirely new ideas, and moved out under the banner of a war on poverty. It was an issue that united rather than divided, and the ranks of its supporters if anything swelled as it moved through the legislative process.

There is nothing, as such, startling about these developments.

They have been foreseen, with either hope or fear, by many persons for many years. However, in recent times a number of events have occurred which very much hasten the process, and make it of greater moment. These have to do (1) with the almost sudden emergence of the fact that the industrial nations of the world seem finally about to learn how to manage their economies, (2) with the professionalization of the middle class, and (3) with the exponential growth of knowledge.

#### The Economic Revolution

Recent years, with the steady advance of technology, have given birth to a good number of neo-apocalyptic views of the future of the American economy, most of them associated with the concept of automation. No one should doubt there is something called automation going on, and that it does change things. However, there is no evidence whatever that it is in fact transforming American society, or any other society. It is simply the newest phase in a process that has been under way for at least two centuries, and will presumably go on and on, past any immediate concern of this age or the next.

At the same time, there is a good deal of evidence, if that is the term for what are little more than everyday impressions, that in the area of economic policy there has occurred a genuine discontinuity, a true break with the past: Men are learning how to make an industrial economy work.

What is involved is something more permanent than simply a run of good luck, or specially refined intuitions on the part of persons responsible for the economic affairs of one nation, or a group of nations. Rather it is the fact that for two decades now, since the end of World War II, the industrial democracies of the world have been able to operate their economies on a high and steadily expanding level of production and employment. Nothing like it has ever happened before in history. It is perhaps the central fact of world politics today. The briefest recollection of what happened to those economies in the two decades that followed the First World War

will suggest why. Moreover, it is a development that has all the markings of a scientific event, of a profound advance in knowledge, as well as of an improvement in statecraft.

In the beginning was the theory. With but little data either to support or confound them, economic theories multiplied and conflicted. But gradually more and better data accumulated: progress begins on social problems when it becomes possible to measure them. As the data accumulated and technology made it possible to calculate more rapidly, the theories gradually became able to explain more, and these in turn led to the improvement in the data. John Maynard Keynes at King's College, Cambridge, and Wesley C. Mitchell at the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York are supremely good symbols of the two processes that ended up in a deeply symbiotic relationship.

And then one day it all more or less hangs together and the world is different, although of course not quite aware of the change. Governments promise full employment and then produce it. (In 1964 unemployment, adjusted to conform more or less to United States definitions, was 2.9 percent in Italy, 2.5 percent in France and Britain, and 0.4 percent in Germany. Consider the contrast with post-World War I.) Governments undertake to expand their economy at a steady rate—and do so. (In 1961 the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which grew out of the Marshall Plan, undertook to increase their output by 50 percent during the decade of the 1960s. The United States, at all events, is right on schedule.)

The ability to predict events, as against controlling them, has developed even more impressively—the Council of Economic Advisers' forecast of GNP for 1964 was off by only \$400 million in a total of \$623 billion; the unemployment forecast was on the nose. There is a temptation, of course, to go too far in presuming what can be done with the economy. The international exchange system is primitive, and at the moment menacing. The stock market can be wildly irrational. There are, as Hyman Lewis points out, competing theories of investment which could bring us to unsettling dilemmas. We in the United States have not achieved full employ-

ment. We have accepted the use of federal taxing and spending powers as a means of social adjustment, but so far only in pleasant formulations. Our willingness to raise taxes, for example, is yet to be tested. In general, the political component of political economy remains very much uncertain. Thus the British, again to cite Lewis, have the best economists but one of the less successful economies. But the fact remains that economics is approaching the status of an applied science.

In the long run this econometric revolution, assuming it works itself out, is bound to have profound effects on the domestic politics of all the nations involved. The central political issue of most industrial nations over the past century and a half has been how to make an economy work. Almost every conceivable nostrum, from the nationalization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange to the free coinage of silver, has been proposed, and most have been tried. Usually without success. In the United States, for one administration after another, economic failure has led to political failure. But if henceforth the business cycle has a longer sweep, and fewer abrupt downturns, the rise and fall of political fortunes may follow the same pattern. Once in power, a party may be much more likely to remain so. Or in any event, the issues that elect or defeat governments could be significantly different from those of the past.

The more immediate impact of this econometric revolution in the United States is that the federal government will be endowed, more often than not, with a substantial, and within limits predictable, rise in revenues available for social purposes. Significantly, the war on poverty began in the same year of the great tax cut. The President was not forced to choose between the measures; he was able to proceed with both. In that sense, the war on poverty began not because it was necessary (which it was) but because it was possible.

The singular nature of the new situation in which the federal government finds itself is that the immediate supply of resources available for social purposes might actually outrun the immediate demand of established programs. Federal expenditures under exist-

ing programs rise at a fairly predictable rate. But, under conditions of economic growth, revenues rise faster. This has given birth to the phenomenon of the "fiscal drag"—the idea that unless the federal government disposes of this annual increment, either by cutting taxes or adding programs, the money taken out of circulation by taxes will slow down economic growth and could, of course, at a certain point stop it altogether.

Thus, assuming the continued progress of the economy in something like the pattern of recent years, there is likely to be \$4-5 billion in additional, unobligated revenue coming in each year. But this increment will only continue to come on condition that it is disposed of. Therefore one of the important tasks to which an administration must address itself is that of devising new and responsible programs for expending public funds in the public interest.

This is precisely the type of decision-making that is suited to the techniques of modern organizations, and which ends up in the hands of persons who make a profession of it. They are less and less political decisions, more and more administrative ones. They are decisions that can be reached by consensus rather than conflict.

#### The Professionalization of the Middle Class

"Everywhere in American life," Kenneth S. Lynn reports, "the professions are triumphant." The period since the G.I. Bill has witnessed an extraordinary expansion of higher education. In the United States, a quarter of the teenage population now goes on to some kind of college, and among specific class and ethnic groups the proportion is as high as three quarters. The trend is unmistakable and probably irresistible: in the course of the coming decades some form of higher education will become near to universal. But most importantly, for more and more persons the form of education will involve professional training. This is not the same thing as traditional higher education; it does not produce the same types of persons.

The difference has been most succinctly stated by Everett C.

Hughes: "Professionals *profess*. They profess to know better than others the nature of certain matters, and to know better than their clients what ails them or their affairs." And he continues: "Lawyers not only give advice to clients and plead their cases for them; they also develop a philosophy of law—of its nature and its functions, and of the proper way in which to administer justice. Physicians consider it their prerogative to define the nature of disease and of health, and to determine how medical services ought to be distributed and paid for. Social workers are not content to develop a technique of case work; they concern themselves with social legislation. Every profession considers itself the proper body to set the terms in which some aspect of society, life or nature is to be thought of, and to define the general lines, or even the details, of public policy concerning it."

As the number of professionals increases, so also does the number of professions, or neo-professions. More and more, middle-class persons are attracted by the independence of judgment, esoteric knowledge, and immunity to outside criticism that characterize professionals. As Everett Hughes puts it: "The YMCA secretary wants his occupation recognized not merely as that of offering young men from the country a pleasant road to Protestant righteousness in the city, but as a more universal one of dealing with groups of young people. All that is learned of adolescence, of behavior in small groups, of the nature and organization of community life is considered the intellectual base of his work."

There are now an extraordinary number of such persons in America. Those Americans classified as professional and technical workers have just passed the 9 million mark—more than the number of "managers, officials, and proprietors," more than the craftsmen and foremen. And of this group, an enormous number are involved in various aspects of social welfare and reform. Through sheer numbers they would tend to have their way; but as professionals in a professionalizing society, they are increasingly entitled to have their way. That is how the system works.

One of the more powerful demonstrations of the influence of professional thinking on programs of social reform is the provision

of the Economic Opportunity Act that community action programs be carried out with the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor themselves. This is one of the most important and pioneering aspects of the entire antipovertry program. But typically this measure was inserted in the legislation not because of any demand of the poor but because the intellectual leaders of the social welfare profession had come to the conclusion that this was indispensable to effective social action. Typically also, the literature describes the process in terms of the use of the "indigenous nonprofessional"—persons identified by the fact that they are not professional. A somewhat ironical turn of events in this area is the role the community action programs are playing in recreating the ethnic political-social organizations of the big city slums—the dismantling of which was for so long the object of political and social reformers in the United States!

The prospect of large-scale opposition to the new professions is, for the moment at least, limited because the professionalization of the middle class has led to a no less extraordinary opening up of careers to talent. The time when any considerable number of persons of great ability and ambition have found their way out of poverty blocked by their inability to obtain an education has all but passed. (There are still many, many persons whose natural abilities are stunted by poverty, but that is another matter.) A nationwide survey of 1960 high school graduates, Project Talent, found that about 97 percent of those in the top 1 percent in aptitude and 93 percent of those in the top 5 percent entered college within a year. Among the next 5 percent (the 90th to 94th percentile), 86 percent did so. As a general proposition, ability is recognized and rewarded in America today as at no time in history. (Michael Young's forecast of the revolt of the lower quartile against the ultimate injustice of a society based on merit may not be discounted, but it is not, on the other hand, scheduled until 2031.)

It is possible that this process, just because it is successful in drawing up talent from lower economic and social groups, will deprive those groups of much of their natural leadership and make them all the more dependent on professionals. Kenneth Clark has

noted that the degree of recruitment of civil rights leaders into "establishment" organizations verges on raiding—and has raised suspicions of hidden motives. On the other hand, there is rather a pronounced tendency for persons from such groups, when they do rise to the middle class, to settle into professions which involve work with the very groups they left behind. Thus, in a certain sense the poor are not so much losing their natural leaders as obtaining them through different routes.

#### The Exponential Growth of Knowledge

Among the complexities of life is the fact that the American business community, in a period when it was fiercely opposed to the idea of economic or social planning, nonetheless supported, even pressed for, the development of a national statistical system which has become the best in the world and which now makes certain types of planning and regulation—although quite different from the collective proposals of earlier eras—both feasible and in a measure inevitable. Much as mountains are climbed, so statistics are used if they are there. As an example, trade union wage settlements in recent years have been profoundly influenced by the wage-price guidelines set by the federal government. This could not possibly have occurred on an essentially voluntary basis were it not that the Bureau of Labor Statistics has developed the technique of measuring productivity—and has done so accompanied, step-by-step, by the business and labor advisory committees that work with the Bureau.

A measure of the near quantum change that has only recently occurred in the information available for social planning in the United States (the development work began long ago, but the pay-off has been rather recent) may be suggested by the fact that the nation went through the Great Depression of the 1930s without ever really knowing what the rate of unemployment was! This was then a measurement taken but once every ten years, by the census. Today, of course, employment and unemployment data are collected monthly and debated in terms of the decimal points.

Similarly, the census has been quietly transformed from a ten-times-a-century proceeding to a system of current accounts on a vast range of social data.

Most of the information that went into the development of the antipoverty program was essentially economic, but the social data available to the President's task force was of singular importance to shaping the program, and in turn the program will greatly stimulate the collection of more such. The nation is clearly on the verge of developing a system of social statistics comparable to the now highly developed system of economic statistics.

The use of all such statistics is developing also. A vast "industry of discovery," to use William Haber's description of events in the physical sciences, is developing in the social sciences as well. Computer technology has greatly enhanced the possible uses of such data. Just as the effort to stimulate the American economy is now well advanced, the simulation of social processes, particularly in decision-making, is also begun and may be expected to produce important, if not indeed revolutionary, insights. Such prospects tend to stir some alarm in thoughtful persons, but it may be noted the public has accepted with calm, even relish, the fact that the outcome of elections is now predicted with surpassing accuracy. If that most solemn of democratic rituals may be simulated without protest, there is not likely to be much outcry against the simulation of various strategies of housing integration, or techniques of conflict resolution, or patterns of child rearing.

Expenditure for social science research was somewhere between \$500 and \$600 million in 1964. This was only 10 percent of the \$6 billion spent in the same year on the life and physical sciences (including psychology), and much less a proportion of the \$19 billion spent on research and development altogether. Nonetheless it represents a sixfold growth in a decade. There is, moreover, some indication social scientists are not yet thinking in the money terms that are in fact available to them. Angus Campbell suggested recently that social scientists still think in budgets of thousands of dollars when they should be thinking of millions. "The prevailing format for social research is still the exploitation of opportunities

which are close at hand, easily manageable, and inexpensive." But, he adds, "there are a good many social scientists who know very well how to study social change on a broad scale and are intensely interested in going about it." The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, which Campbell directs, has under way a year-long panel survey of the impact of the 1964 tax cut on the nation's taxpayers, a specific example of the use of social science techniques in the development of economic policy.

All in all, the prospect is for a still wider expansion of knowledge available to governments as to how people behave. This will be accompanied by further improvement of the now well-developed knowledge of what they think. Public opinion polls are already a daily instrument of government decision-making (a fact which has clearly affected the role of the legislature). In combination these two systems of information make it possible for a government to respond intelligently and in time to the changing needs and desires of the electorate. The day when mile-long petitions and mass rallies were required to persuade a government that a popular demand existed that things be done differently is clearly drawing to a close. Indeed, the very existence of such petitions and rallies may in time become a sign that what is being demanded is *not yet* a popular demand.

#### The Perils of Progress

The professionalization of reform will proceed, regardless of the perils it presents. Even in the face of economic catastrophe, which is certainly conceivable if not probable, the response will be vastly more systematic and informed than any of the past.

A certain price will be paid, and a considerable risk will be incurred. The price will be a decline in the moral exhilaration of public affairs at the domestic level. It has been well said that the civil rights movement of the present time has at last provided the youth of America with a moral equivalent of war. The more general effect of the civil rights movement has been a much heightened

public concern for human dignity and welfare. This kind of passion could seep out of the life of the nation, and we would be the less for it.

The risk is a combination of enlightenment, resources, and skill which in the long run, to use Harold D. Laswell's phrase, becomes a "monocracy of power."

But the potential rewards are not less great. The creation of a society that can put an end to the "animal miseries" and stupid controversies that afflict most peoples would be an extraordinary achievement of the human spirit. The argument may be made, for example, that had the processes described in this article not progressed as far as they had by 1961, the response of the federal government to the civil rights revolution would have been thoroughly inadequate: that instead of joining with and helping to direct the movement, the national government would have trailed behind with grudging, uncomprehending, and increasingly inadequate concessions that could have resulted in the problem of the Negro American becoming insoluble in terms of existing American society.

The prospect that the more primitive social issues of American politics are at last to be resolved need only mean that we may now turn to issues more demanding of human ingenuity than that of how to put an end to poverty in the richest nation in the world. Many such issues might be in the area of foreign affairs, where the enormity of difficulty and the proximity of disaster is sufficient to keep the citizens and political parties of the nation fully occupied. And there is also the problem of perfecting, to the highest degree possible, the quality of our lives and of our civilization. We may not be accustomed to giving political priority to such questions. But no one can say they will be boring or trivial!



What is to be made of these closing passages? The Vietnam war surely set the limits of professionalization. The public never demanded such a war, or saw the compelling need for it. It was the

decision of a tiny handful of professionals in government, and ruined two presidencies. Professionals who, for one thing, never noticed the Sino-Soviet split of the same decade; so much for expertise. As for "the quality of our lives," the environmental movement of the next decade surely represented such a development; in part, I would hazard, in response to too much in the way of foreign affairs. As for the proposition that we might "now turn to issues more demanding of human ingenuity than how to put an end to poverty in the richest nation in the world," I equivocate. The crisis of dependency that developed three decades later was addressed early on as merely a problem of poverty. This may in part have been a result of a relative absence of data (see Chapter 6).

#### *The Professionalization of Reform (1995)*

Thirty years ago, in the first article of the first issue of *The Public Interest*, I published some observations on "The Professionalization of Reform" which thirty years later can be read, selectively, without overmuch embarrassment. I had served as Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy Planning and Research in the Kennedy years and had carried on under Johnson. The memory is almost lost now, but the Kennedy years were a time of almost feverish efforts to get around the disinclination of Congress to spend money. My first meeting in the Oval Office involved a pay raise for government employees. Even Congress would want to side with the National Association of Letter Carriers! Then a double dividend for Veterans Administration life insurance. Next a tax cut. Then revenue sharing, the chairman of the Council, Walter E. Heller, reasoning that if Congress would not spend the money, possibly the governors would. This mode took us through the decade with but a single recession at the very end.

The Nixon administration continued in just this vein. Revenue sharing was enacted. A guaranteed income was proposed and almost enacted. George P. Shultz became director of the new Office of Management and Budget. A University of Chicago economist, he

set about elaborating a formal definition of a full employment budget, one in which outlays equal revenues at full employment. Absent full employment, a *deliberate deficit* would stimulate the economy in that direction. On into the seventies when *five* successive tax cuts were enacted.

The success was stunning: so much that it has gone almost unnoticed. The wild gyrations of a capitalist economy gave way to a sequence of more or less uniform business cycles in which the economy grew, faster, then slower, but with only one significant decline. Before 1929 the average business cycle contraction lasted nearly 21 months following an average expansion of slightly more than 25. Over the past 50 years, the average recovery has lasted 50 months, with contractions shortened to an average of 11. In all this past half century, the largest *decline* in output was 2.2 percent, in 1982. Compare that with a drop of 9.9 percent in 1930; followed by 7.7 percent in 1931; followed by 14.8 percent in 1932. As of mid-1995, for example, we are in our tenth postwar expansion which reached its 58th month in January. During the half century per person, the size of our economy has quadrupled, and real income per person has more than doubled. Wealth accumulated but society decayed.

#### The Health Care Imbrogljo

A pattern emerged. Great undertakings are proposed in political campaigns, often crafted by professional techniques such as polling and focus groups. If the campaign succeeds, the undertaking is taken as validated. Experts are set to work and the bill emerges. In this regard there has been no equal to the health care reform project of the Clinton administration during the 103rd Congress. Health insurance had been on the national agenda at least since 1934 when Roosevelt set up the Committee on Economic Security which drafted the Social Security Act of the following year. It had not been solely a Democratic concern; the Nixon administration, as usual, had proposed a considerable health measure. But it was rejected by